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ROOFING INC. ,
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vs.
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DefendantAppellant.
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED
ITS CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT.
A.

Reasons for Termination of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff complains, in an effort to distract the Court
from the real issues, that it was not aware that the Salt Lake
Board would claim a violation of the roofing contract until
the trial had begun.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 6).

This state-

ment is incorrect since the answer claimed failure to work in
a "professional, workmanlike and expeditious manner" and admissions sent to Plaintiff clearly asked it to admit or deny
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the existence of the protection and sealing requirern
contract and its failure to properly perform it.

ent int:

(R., p, ll

Plaintiffs are trying to disguise the real change ·
in positic·
In response to the request for admissions Plaintiff
plead that the original contract had been orally modif~.
(R., p. 40).

Likewise, the plaintiff up to the second dayo:

trial argued that the contract had been modified by the allt
statements of the school district employees.
159).

(Tr., pp. lS\-

There can be no doubt, therefore, that Plaintiff was

well aware that Paragraph 11 in the contract was one ground
which Defendant relied upon in dismissing Plaintiff from the
roofing project.
Plaintiff has characterized its dismissal from the pro·
ject as caused solely from the failure to seal the roof. It
is also incorrect.

Throughout the trial the Salt Lake City

School District argued that it was entitled to terminate Pll
tiff from the project because of the company 1 s failure to ir
perly protect the building from water damage and from its C!
tinuous subsequent delays in both failing to prevent~
damage and in failing to complete the work.

Exhibits 16P a:

19P demonstrate the concern the district had as to the plai:
tiff 1 s performance and testimony further demonstrated thi
Exhibit 16P is a letter dated October 30, 1974 to

5
•

pla ·

·

tiff roofing corporation from Bruce F. Ririe, Director of;.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11:

:c

ings and Grounds for the Salt Lake City School District.

This

letter in pertinent part said the following:

There was a serious roof leak on the above
project over the weekend of October 19-21,
1974. This was caused when the crews removed the old roof and did not get a new
one back on before the storm. The roof has
continued leaking and causing further damage with every subsequent storm during the
last two weeks. As of this date our crews
have had to work a total of 31 hours overtime • • • • We would encourage you to move
as rapidly as possible to complete your
contract. The longer the roof is left open
the more damage will result. So far it has
not disrupted the school program but if we
get a heavy storm it very well could. The
damage cost could then become substantial.
Exhibit 19, a letter to Plaintiff roofing company by Mr.
Ririe dated November 5 summarizes the reasons for the termination of Plaintiff from the roofing job.

This letter in pertin-

ent part states the following:

* * *
Your crew started work the last part of September and completed approximately 4,000
square feet of reroofing. They then started
on the main building and had part of the old
roof removed when it rained over the weekend
of October 20. You attempted to cover over
the roof with visqueen but this was not successful and water damage resulted in the
building. It was necessary to work our crews
overtime to handle this emergency. The cost
of this damage is now approaching an estimate
of $2,000 including the labor charges accrued.
You assured us that you would immediately get
the new roof on as soon as the rain stopped.
In fact, you quoted us the date of Saturday,
November 2, 1974 and you intended to bring in
a lar'~"' crew and complete the work. You later
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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assured us this would happen on Monday, November 4, 1974 for certain.
In actual fact, what has happened is that no
one showed up to work November 2 and on Nov.o-illber 4, your crews came and removed their
equipment stating the roof was too wet to
work on and they were going to another job.
An examination of the roof showed it to be
dry except for one or two spots that could
easily be dried out with a torch.
We are very disappointed in your performance
of this project. You were slow getting on
the job and have only worked sporadically
since. You have made no attempt to clean up
the water inside the building or protect it.
It has been necessary for our crews to do it
all.
We have been unable to contact you by telephone on November 4 and 5. Therefore, we
are sending you this registered letter to inform you that unless the new roof is installed
where the old was torn off and the roof leaks
caused by your crews repaired by Saturday, November 9, 1974 so there is no further water
damage inside the building, your contract with
us will be cancelled • • • •
If you do go ahead to complete this project
we expect that any further work will be done
in such a manner that there will be no further water damage to the building or its contents.
Thus, the defendant school district did not abruptly ano
recklessly terminate the plaintiff because of one incident in·
valving a leaky roof.

The sum total of the leaky roof, the

·
di' sruption to the edu·
delays in protecting it, the continuing
t the in:·
cation process, the delays in completing the projec 1
tors resu
bility to communicate with Plaintiff, and other f ac
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ted in the termination of the contract.

As stated in Appel-

lant •s main brief, the Salt Lake District was not required
to allow further damage to its building, further delay, and
further unconventional methods of roofing to be utilized but
had the right at that point to terminate Plaintiff and to pay
it for its previous services.

The fact that the district was

partially paid for some of the damage incurred does not negate
the right of the district to terminate Plaintiff from the job
before payment and while damage was occurring daily.
B.
Determination of Breach Does Not Involve Waiver
Question.
Plaintiff argues that it was proper for the trial court
to consider the issue of waiver before determining whether a
breach had been committed.

Plaintiff stated, "Thus, if the

question of waiver is disputed, based on the evidence, that
~

would

fortiori put the question of breach in dispute, since

it would be disputed whether in fact at the time of the alleged
breach there was even a clause to the contract to be breached."
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 8) •
This assumption is erroneous.

The trial court specifi-

cally found that the parties had ~ orally modified the contract.

Had an oral modification of the contract been present

then Paragraph 11, requiring protection of the building, would
have been eliminated from consideration.
nc'L

tne s~rn~;

·3S

However, waiver is

modification since waiver only excuses a breach.
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5 Willston on Contracts, Section 676, pp. 219-222.

In the:;
circumstances modification must precede the b reach while
Wai·

ver can only be made subsequent to a breach.
Instruction No. 14, given to the J'ury (R.,

p • 100)' Sta·

ted this principle as follows:
Under ordinary circumstances where there is
an existing actual breach of contract of a
character going to the essence, the innocent
party will, if he insists on performance notwithstanding the breach, keep alive his own
obligation to continue with performance,
with the result that the party at fault, even
though having in the interval done nothing
in reliance on a continuance of performance,
may, if he sees fit, turn about and hold the
innocent party to performance. In other
words, a party may waive a breach by the
other party and then be liable for his own
subsequent breach.
This instruction recognizes the general principle of la•
that waiver is a defense to a claim of breach of contract whe:
the innocent party still seeks performance from the
party.

breachin~

Plaintiff in its brief even admits this when it state:

"Waiver is a defense raised to Defendant-Appellant's claim
that Plaintiff-Respondent breached its contract."
dent's brief, p. 10).

(Respon·

For these reasons Plaintiff's assertia:

that waiver was an integral part of breach is incorrect.
Analyzing this principle in terms of burden of proo
ly shows the procedure which should have been

. lized.
Utl

f cle'

·

Pla~

tiff had the initial burden of showing that a contract was en
tered into with the school district and that it had been te!'.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ted

by

the district.

At that point a judgment could have been

rendered against the district if it did not have a defense.
The district, in its case, had the burden of proving that
the termination was excused because Plaintiff had breached its
contract to perform work in a workmanlike manner and in accordance to the requirements of the contract.

If the district

could sustain its burden and show that an actual breach had
occurred then judgment for the defendant could be made as a
matter of law.

In this case it was undisputed and conceded

that the roof was not sealed, that the work was not done during
the two-week interval of the rainstorms, and that the building
was damaged as a result of the actions of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff at this point had to show that the district's
excuse was itself excused.

The party claiming a waiver has

the burden of proof of the facts on which he relies to establish
such waiver and unless such proof is forthcoming he cannot sustain his claim to it.
P· 861.

28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §173,

It was thus incumbent upon the plaintiff in rebuttal

to show that the agents had expressed, implied, or apparent authority to make a waiver and that the elements of waiver were
present--thereby excusing any breach the district was claiming.
Unfortunately, the trial did not proceed in this orderly
manner but testimony as to waiver, agency, breach, and damages
was mingled throughout both the plaintiff's and defendant's ca-

-7-
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..
ses.

This confusion is seen most markedl Y in
· th e outcome ::

the instructions to the J·ury, the special

i.·

n t errogatories,

and the failure of the trial court to rule as a ma t ter of :,.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in not rulir.;
matter of law that a breach of contract had occurred by t~:.
duct of Plaintiff and erred further in submitting this ques:.
to the jury with incomplete and erroneous instructions.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF WAIVER TO BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE JURY AND ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY.

A.
There is a Substantial Difference Between Waiver o:
Modification.
Plaintiff claimed in its brief that it was under no oL
gation to plead or give notice of the claimed waiver of Par:graph 11.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10) •

Utah is a notice·

pleading state and the parties to a lawsuit are entitled tc i:
the theories of the adversary before entering the courtroo::.
That is especially true here where pre-trial discovery rei;-;e:·
Plaintiff to disclose its legal theories; but Plaintiff, at:suggestion of the Judge, changed its theory on the second dr
of trial.
Defendant's answer setting forth the affirmative defe~;;
that the work was not done according to the specificaticns:.:
t 1· "e
"

in a workmanlike manner clearly put Plaintiff upon noSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'.'.'

~his

was the justification for the termination of the contract.

At that point Plaintiff could have filed a reply to Defendant• s
answer,

by

leave court, under Rule 7, U.R.C.P. and thus raised

waiver as a defense -co Defendant's affirmative defense.

Panson

v. Pappas, 206 P. 261 (Utah 1922).
More importantly, it is evident that waiver was never contemplated

by

the plaintiff at any time until the second day of

trial since in Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Requests for
Admissions the following question and answer was given:
1.
That the contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant require that at the end of
each working day the roof would be sealed to
prevent water damage to the building and its
contents.
Response:
Denied. The written contract was later modified by an oral contract between the parties.
(R., p. 40).

Likewise, Plaintiff's counsel argued modification of the contract in the first portion of the trial but this theory was rejected by the trial court.

(Tr., pp. 305-306).

waiver was first presented by the Judge himself.

The concept of

(Tr., pp. 159-

160) •

The sudden emergence of the "waiver" theory midway through
trial no doubt accounts to a large extent for the confusion
that was present in the presentation of evidence and in the instnctions to the jury.

Neither side submitted jury instruc-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions to the court containing these elements of a

gency or wa_

ver.
There is obviously a world of difference between

a modi-

fication of a contract and a waiver of terms in an existing
contract.

In the first instance, the burden is upon the plat:

tiff to show the creation of the modified contract and Presumably if the contract is thus shown the plaintiff will prevai.
The defendant, in such a case, can only argue that such a cor.·
tract was not made, and presumably will prevail if he can convince the court or jury of the non-existence of the rnodificat:
Waiver, on the other hand, involves a showing by the pk
tiff of the original contract, a claim by the defendant that
the original contract had been breached, and the response by
the plaintiff that the defendant waived any claim to assert
such a breach.

The elements going to an oral modification of

a written contract are likewise completely different from the
elements necessary for a waiver of an existing contract--sucr.
as the necessity for new consideration when modification is ai.
leged.

Wood v. Brighton Mills, 297 F. 594, 600 (3rd Cir. l91i

This Court in Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 6l pJ
308 (Utah 1936} defined waiver as an intentional relinquish·
ment of known rights, and stated that to constitute a waiver
there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage,
of existence thereof, and intention to relinquish
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1· t

]<nowli:

which i'

distinctly made.
In order for a plaintiff to show a waiver of a contractual
provision it is necessary to show an intentional relinquislunent
of a known right.
308

Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 61 P.2d

(Utah 1936); Bjark v. April Industries Inc., 547 P.2d 219

(Utah 1976).
It is crucial that knowledge and intention of the waiver
be shown and proved by the party claiming it.

The general

rule is as follows:
It must generally be shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of
his rights or of all the material facts upon
which they depended. No man can be bound by a
waiver of his rights unless such waiver is distinctly made, with full knowledge of the rights
which he intends to waive; and the fact that he
knows his rights and intends to waive them
must plainly appear. Ignorance of a material
fact negatives waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of facts. Waiver presupposes a full knowledge of an existing right or
privilege and something done designedly or knowingly to relinquish it. 28 Am.Jur., Estoppel
and Waiver, Section 158, p. 841: 17A C.J.S.,
Contracts, §492(1), p. 696.
It is also fundamental that a waiver of a right or privilege is
not presumed from mere silence alone.

Id. at p. 697.

There

is no presumption that a waiver has occurred, and courts use
every reasonable intendment against the finding of waiver.

~tic Ref.

Co,

v,

At-

Wyoming Nat. Bank, 51 A.2d 719 (Penn. 1947) •
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B.

Insufficiency of Evidence Showing Waiver.

Waiver was not an appropriate theory for this

case. The

elements necessary to show waiver were not present ·

in this

case even viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff.

o:

Paragraph 11 of the contract is entitled, "Protection
Building from Water Damage".

Plaintiff in its brief apparent.

argues that the agents of Defendant school district waived sv

-·

protection and that any damage resulting to the building coul:
not be chargeable to the roofing company.

This assumption is

clearly unsupportable.
Reviewing the testimony cited by Plaintiff in its brief
concerning the covering and sealing of the roof, shows that a:
the most the agents of Defendant agreed to open up larger m
of the roofing surface on the assumption that visqueen would:
used to protect the building.

(Respondent's brief, pp. H

1
•

Mr. Jensen, Defendant's building inspector, testified t'.:
told Plaintiff's employees it was their responsibility to pre:
the building and denied that he ever gave approval to use vis:
but stated that he would have to consult Mr. Ririe to determ:
whether this would be possible.

(Respondent's brief, P· SJ.

Even if Jensen's testimony was completely disbelieved ar:
the favorable testimony given by the plaintiff's witnesses

10

fully believed there is still no showing of a knowledgeable<
ver.

In each instance quoted by Respondent the tearing up c'
rct:

large areas was conditioned upon the use of visqueen to P

cc

Plaintiff assured Defendant's agent that "
the
building.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

queen would prevent damage--Plaintiff was the expert and Defendant justifiably relied upon its expertise in acquiescing to
the new procedure.

If there was a waiver it was made under

a "mistake or misapprehension of facts" that visqueen would
protect the building even if it was not sealed in the customary
manner.
Ken Bills stated that he was never told by anyone in Defendant's employment that the company was not responsible for
preventing water from entering the building.

(Tr., p. 192).

Russell Bills testified he considered it his responsibility to
prevent water damage to the building and that it was a necessary workmanlike procedure to protect the building.

(Tr., p.

All of Plaintiff's witnesses agreed that they had to,

101).

in some way, protect the building.
It therefore can hardly be said that Defendant's agents,
even assuming they had such authority, knowingly waived their
right to insist that the building be protected from water damage,
and, at the most, agreed to allow a new procedure in which the
roof would not be done in small areas and sealed each night but
would be done in large areas with visqueen on hand to seal the
roof when necessary.
Likewise, the conduct of Defendants in writing the letters
previously referred to as Exhibits 16 and 19 show the clear intent of Defendant in holding Plaintiff responsible for both the
water

•
""''""'~ tnat
had already occurred, for future water d am-

r13~-

·~
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age, and for delay.
In Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical Co
---...!.'

406 P.2d 556 (Or. 1965) it was claimed that an owner

waived his right to insist that a contractor provi'de
on it.

of a sf,:

insuran:,

The court in that case looked upon the intent of the

owner and held that he did not ever intend to release his rfo
to receive damages from fire simply because he tried to obta:·
other insurance policies.

The court in that case quoted a pr;

vious Oregon Supreme Court case which stated the rule as fol·
lows:
• • • (I]n the absence of an express agreement a waiver will not be presumed or implied contrary to the intention of the parties whose rights would be injuriously affected thereby, unless by his conduct the
opposite party has been mislead, to his
prejudice, into the honest belief that such
waiver was intended or consented to. To
make out a case of waiver of a legal right
there must be a clear, unequivocal, and
decisive act of the party showing such a
purpose or act amounting to estoppel on his
part.. • • Id. at 568.
Obviously, none of the parties in this action ever consi·
dered the school district to have waived the requirement that
Plaintiff protect the building from water damage.

Plaintiff"

d
own employees admitted this fact, the letters from the boar·

education substantiated it further, and the efforts of Plain~:
that Plaint::
to correct the water problem conclusively Showed
was responsible for the damage.
-14-
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Thu~

Plaintiff did not change its position in any way

in reliance upon the alleged statements made by the employees
of the school district.

It obviously did not change its posi-

tion with reference to what it considered to be its obligation
to prevent water damage to the building and its contents.
what actually occurred was that the plaintiff was ineffective
in accomplishing its responsibility.

The submission of In-

struction 14, in speaking in terms of "estoppel", was clearly
unjustified and erroneous.
There was never any testimony or evidence showing that
the alleged approval by Mr. Jensen or Mr. Ririe was made with
the knowledge that the visqueen plastic would not protect the
building from damage.
expert.

Plaintiff was supposed to be the roofing

Even under the doctrine of apparent or ostensible au-

thority it cannot be said that an agent's power goes beyond
what is usual or necessary as ordinary administrative duties
and an act which is adverse to the interest of the principal
and which will not benefit him is clearly outside of any such
authority.

McConner v. Dickson, 233 P.2d 877 (Wyo. 1951).

For the agents of Defendant to have waived the requirement
of Rrotectin~ the building would clearly have been adverse to

the interest of the school district and even if they had intended to do so there was obviously no authority either apparent
or implied.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, there was no sufficient evidence showing

waiver ,,

Paragraph 11 or the requirement that the job be done e.xpedj.
tiously in a workmanlike manner to submit to the J'ury.

Ther,

was no conflicting evidence negating the fact that the buiJ;.
ing was not protected and continued to be damaged during the
two-week period.
For this reason, the court should have ruled as a matte;
of law that no waiver was present and should have entered a
verdict in favor of Defendant.

Instead, the issue of waiver

was submitted to the jury in Instruction No. 14 with no gui·
dance as to the definition of waiver (including its essentia:
elements) or no instruction that the agent had to have expre<
implied, or apparent authority.

To confuse the jury even fur·

ther, no interrogatory as to waiver was asked--only as to br:
Additionally, the court's failure to rule as a matter o'.
law that waiver was not present in this case was clearly em·
neous.
CONCLUSION
This case involves extremely diff.icult legal concepts of
breach, waiver, authority, and burden of proof.

Admittedly,

these concepts are d i·ff·icu lt for lawyers and J. udges to thorc~
ly understand--this is why a jury has an

;mpossible task bef::

~ ..

it when the court fails to sift the unnecessary

issues and

t:

allow the whole conglomeration to fall into the jury's iw·
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with no instructions as to how to solve the problem.
Here, the trial court submitted the question of Plaintiff's breach to the jury when no factual question existed.
The building wasn't protected, the damage wasn't stopped, and
therefore the plaintiff unequivocally breached its obligation
of protection of the building and performing in a worlananlike
manner.
Here, the trial court submitted the question of waiver to
the jury when there was absolutely no evidence that Defendant's
agents had any authority to waive any contract provision and
where the elements of waiver were not ever met.

How can Plain-

tiff claim that Defendant's agents waived protection of the
building from damage when the testimony cited by Plaintiff in
its brief always was conditioned on the presence of visqueen?
Even if it is assumed arguendo that a jury issue was present the poor and incomplete instructions given to the jury
on the elements of waiver, the complete absence of any instruction as to authority, and the failure to submit interrogatories
concerning authority and waiver constituted a final error.
Much of this confusion is traceable to the failure of
Plaintiff to give proper notice of his theory of the case.
since the trial judge himself suggested the theory to Plaintiff's counsel during the second day of trial, it is easy to
see why such notice wasn't given.

Defendant was denied the
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But

chance to properly present its case because of this untimely
change in theories.
For these reasons this Court should enter judgment in fa.

vor of Defendant, or, in the alternative, order a new trial, .
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